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Abstract 
'Green Economy' and 'Living Well ('Vivir Bien)' have emerged as contending macro-policies in the search for 
a future direction that meets human needs whilst respecting environmental limits. There are a number of 
different interpretations of each concept but the dominant discourses in relation to each are distinct. Green 
Economy is presented as a fundamentally technological, managerial and market-based approach, whilst 
Living Well is considered to imply redistribution of wealth, inter-personal and inter-species reciprocity and 
eco-socialist development in harmony with nature. Contributing to the debate on the most effective strategic 
direction to take to achieve equitable and effective eco-social transition, this article examines the processes, 
politics and early impacts of attempts to implement these macro-policies in South Korea, a global Green 
Economy leader, and Bolivia, at the forefront of promoting the Living Well approach.  
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Résumé 
La «économie verte» et «Vivir Bien» (Living Well) ont émergé comme différentes macro-politiques dans la 
recherche d'une orientation qui répond aux besoins humains tout en respectant les limites environnementales. 
Il y a un certain nombre d'interprétations différentes de chaque concept, mais leurs discours dominants sont 
distincts. L'économie verte est présenté comme une approche fondamentalement technologique, fondée sur le 
marché et basé sur la gestion, tandis que Living Well est considérée comme impliquant une redistribution de 
la richesse, de la réciprocité entre les personnes et entre les espèces, et le développement de l'éco-socialiste en 
harmonie avec la nature. Contribuer au débat sur l'orientation stratégique la plus efficace à prendre pour 
parvenir à la transition équitable et efficace à l'éco-socialisme, cet article examine les processus, la politique 
et des premiers effets de tentatives pour mettre en œuvre ces politiques macroéconomiques en Corée du Sud, 
un leader mondial dans économie verte, et de la Bolivie, à l'avant-garde de la promotion de l'approche Living 
Well. 
Mots clés: Environnement, développement, Vivir Bien, macro-politique, le changement climatique, le Sud 
Global 
 
Resumen  
'Economía Verde' y 'Vivir Bien' se han convertido en contendientes las macropolíticas en la búsqueda de una 
futura dirección que satisfaga las necesidades humanas, respetando los límites ambientales. Aunque hay 
muchas interpretaciones de cada uno, el discurso dominante sobre 'Economía Verde' presenta un enfoque 
fundamentalmente tecnológica, de gestión y basado en el mercado, mientras que la comprensión corriente 
principal de Vivir Bien es que se articula una perspectiva ecosocialista, abogando por la redistribución de la 
riqueza, la reciprocidad y el desarrollo en armonía con la naturaleza. Contribuir al debate sobre la dirección 
estratégica más eficaz de tomar para lograr la transición eco- social equitativo y eficaz, este trabajo analiza los 
procesos, la política y los impactos tempranos de los intentos de poner en práctica estas macro- políticas en 
Corea del Sur, líder mundial de Economía Verde, y Bolivia, a la vanguardia de la promoción del enfoque 
Vivir Bien. 
Palabras clave: Medio ambiente, desarrollo, Vivir Bien, macro-política, el cambio climático, del Hemisferio 
Sur 
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초록  
환경의 한계를 고려한 인간욕구 충족이라는 가치를 실현하기 위해 최근 “녹색경제” 와 "Living Well" 
('Vivir Bien') 이라는 거시적 정책방향이 한국과 브라질 양국에서 각각 부각되었다. 녹색경제와 "Living 
Well" 을 어떻게 정의할지를 두고는 여러 해석이 존재하는 것이 사실이나, 이들 개념을 둘러싼 주요 
담론들은 뚜렷한 경향을 드러낸다. 녹색경제는 근본적으로 기술적이고, 조직에 중점을 두며, 시장을 
기반으로 한 접근인 반면, Living Well은 부의 재분배, 인간 간 생물종들 간 상호호혜, 그리고 자연과 
조화를 이루는 환경적 사회발전을 그 기치로 한다. 글로벌 그린 경제의 리더인 한국과 Living Well 
접근의 선구자인 브라질에서 이러한 거시정책이 도입되는 과정, 역학관계, 그리고 도입 초기에 
나타난 영향 등을 검증함으로써, 본 연구는 보다 평등하고 효과적인 환경적 사회로의 전환을 
이루어내기 위한 전략적 접근에 대한 논의에 시사점을 제공한다.  
 
1. Introduction 
As the evidence mounts that the climate crisis has been caused by humans (e.g. IPCC 2013; Steffen et 
al. 2015), there has been a gradual but growing acceptance of the need for more environmentally harmonious 
societies. At the same time, traditional economic and political approaches are critiqued for their continuing 
failure to meet a number of basic human needs. For example, approximately one in three people globally are 
still without access to improved sanitation (UNICEF/WHO 2012); one in six lack access to electricity (IEA  
2013); one in eight are without improved drinking water (UNICEF/WHO 2012); one in eight are without 
clean and safe cooking fuels (IEA 2013); and one in eight lack enough food to meet the minimum daily 
energy requirement (FAO, 2013). Furthermore, since 2008, many countries have been impacted by a deep 
economic recession which has widened and deepened poverty and deprivation.  
Hence, many now agree that we need a fundamental change in our human activities, or an 'eco-social' 
transition, to address these crises and avert further catastrophic harm. Whilst there is no standard usage of the 
term 'eco-social' and it often lacks formal definition (e.g. Koch and Fritz 2014), it is generally used to describe 
integrated and progressive social and environmental policies, practices or institutions. For example, Gough 
refers to the need for a "unified eco-social policy that can achieve ecologically beneficial and socially just 
impacts" (2013: 199). It is this understanding of 'eco-social' that is discussed here in the context of 
considering how to transition to an ecological society whilst achieving greater equity in processes and 
outcomes. 
Burke and Shear advocate researchers contribute to achieving such a transition through "…examining 
the tremendously diverse, already-existing experiments with other ways of being in the world" (2014: 130). In 
accord with this, there has been recent debate and comparative analysis of different models of 'environmental 
states' (see, for example, Duit 2015; Gough 2016; Koch and Fritz 2014 and Sommerer 2016). This article 
contributes to this debate, whilst focusing on the overall global trajectory of change, considering whether, for 
example, the global institutions should continue to support a fundamentally market-based approach to eco-
social transition or align themselves with a more radical alternative. These are crucial and timely questions 
since we have, perhaps, just twenty years within which to create the social practices that will enable us to 
avoid irreversibly overstepping planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). We appear 
to be at a crossroads in terms of the diverging path that we could take. Hence, it is imperative that the steps 
we take now do not lead to a figurative or literal 'dead-end.'  
Recent macro-'experiments' in new ways of bringing about eco-social transition at a national level 
include a 'green economy' (e.g. South Korea); an ecological civilisation (China); a sufficient economy 
(Thailand) and 'Living Well' (e.g. in Bolivia). Though there are overlaps and parallels among them, and they 
all claim to address environmental, social and economic crises simultaneously, they generally represent 
different and somewhat contradictory development directions. Therefore, it is vital to explore their 
consequences and implications. This article looks at two of these, the 'Green Economy' because it is currently 
the dominant model internationally, and 'Living Well', because it is the most radical alternative in terms of its 
ethos and values.  
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The article is based on a comprehensive study of how to achieve environmental justice carried out by 
the author between 2008 and 2014. This research included six months of fieldwork; participatory 
observations; secondary quantitative and qualitative data analysis; and 140 interviews with a range of state 
representatives, civil society organizers, local 'experts', academics, workers and residents. Due to limited 
space, it is not possible to describe each method and its findings in sufficient detail here and so this article 
draws mainly on the interview and quantitative material, though it is important to point out that this data 
generally reinforced that derived from the other methods. With regard to the interviews, a minimum of twenty 
participants were included from each country, all leaders or spokespersons for much wider bodies e.g. 
national trade unions, Governmental environmental directorates, local and national NGOs. The interviewees 
were selected using 'purposive' (because they had particular knowledge or experience) and 'opportunistic' 
(because they were available) sampling methods. At the same time, care was taken to include a diversity of 
voices in each country, in terms of varieties of opinion, as well as demographic characteristics such as class, 
age and ethnicity. For example, the interview sample was made up of a 50/50 split of government opponents 
and supporters and a representative proportion of the class, age and gender structure of the country. The 
article focuses on one aspect of the overall study - the proposed strategic solutions to the multiple social, 
economic and environmental global crises. It begins with a brief outline of the theoretical underpinnings of 
the Green Economy and Living Well approaches and goes on to examine the lessons from their practical 
implementation in South Korea and Bolivia, so far. Overall, I will argue that the Living Well approach is 
more successful, even in this early stage, for achieving the kind of transition that is necessary to avert 
ecological and social catastrophe. However, it is also more challenging. Green Economy sits easily within a 
capitalist context, whilst Living Well does not. Hence, if adopted, Living Well will require a fundamental 
reassessment and reorientation of prevailing political, economic and social systems.  
 
2. The Green Economy and Living Well paradigms 
Whilst interpretations of Green Economy and Living Well vary and there is some overlap between 
them, their dominant interpretations are quite opposed. The two schools of thought are primarily divided with 
regard to their positions on:  
 
• What the relative role of markets, state and community should be in achieving sustainability;  
• whether it is necessary to maintain a growth based economy;  
• whether environmental problems are technical or political;  
• whether solutions can be applied incrementally within current structures, or whether they 
require profound and immediate structural change, and;  
• the extent to which inequality must be addressed.  
 
Their most striking point of departure is with regard to the issue of capitalism, with 'Green Economy' 
being typically promoted by capitalist states and their proponents, while 'Living Well' is only currently 
promoted by socialist or anti-capitalist leaning states and their supporters. The capitalist system is a point of 
contention among those who strive for environmental and social justice, with some believing that capitalism 
is compatible with, or even ideally suited to, the task of environmental transition (for example, Porritt 2007) 
whilst others suggest that the market economy, as the source of environmental and social crises, could never 
be part of a solution (for example, Magdoff and Foster 2011).  
Living Well and Green Economy, therefore, generally attract support from different sides of the 
political spectrum. However, they are contested concepts and definitions vary so it is important to outline the 
range of interpretations of each. Hence, the next sections summarize the key definitions, contexts and 
arguments that pertain to each concept, beginning with Green Economy. It is important to note, firstly, that 
Green Economy is not an entirely new approach but, with the multiple crises of recent years, governments, 
policy-makers, businesses and policy-influencing groups have become particularly interested in the concept of 
late because of its inherent promise to kick start sluggish economies. A policy framework for the Green 
Economy has recently gained prominence through a series of reports and initiatives by the major supra-
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national development agencies, particularly the UNEP (2011); the World Bank (2012) and the OECD (2011; 
2012a). While Shear (2014) sees Green Economy as encompassing a wide sphere of activity which may be 
capitalist, anti-capitalist or non-capitalist, the most dominant definitions describe it as a predominantly 
market-oriented (i.e. capitalist) approach, with the main role of governments being to provide enabling 
conditions and incentives for private investment or various 'nudges' to encourage different lifestyle choices 
(Cook 2012; Ferguson 2015; UNDESA 2012; UNEP 2011). The fact that environmental degradation has not 
been prevented in the past is attributed to market failures, such as not valuing natural capital sufficiently, 
and/or registering the costs of its degradation (OECD 2011; UNEP 2011). Hence, the Green Economy 
emphasizes economic growth, pricing mechanisms and technological innovation as the way to reduce social 
and environmental problems (e.g. UNEP 2011). It is considered that "…the greening of economies has the 
potential to be a new engine of growth, a net generator of decent jobs and a vital strategy to eliminate 
persistent poverty" (UNEP 2011: 16). Economic growth (defined here as an increase in the productivity of 
goods and services, as measured by GDP or GNP) is perceived as necessary to achieve sufficient jobs, 
prosperity and human wellbeing. Hence, the majority of national governments have consistently made it clear 
that they do not want to sacrifice growth for the environment. In the face of an increasing realization of the 
planetary limits to growth, they argue that it is not the amount of growth that matters, but the type of growth. 
It is proposed that 'Green-Growth' will simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other 
environmental harms at the same time as stimulating economic recovery and, thereby, reducing global 
poverty and inequality. In 2009, all the countries of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) signed a Green Growth declaration committing them to pursuing Green Growth 
strategies (OECD 2012a). Following this in 2011, UNEP stated that:  
 
The key aim for a transition to a green economy is to enable economic growth and investment 
while increasing environmental quality and social inclusiveness (UNEP 2011: 16). 
 
One of the key arguments for 'Green Growth' is that, if sustainability and economic growth are presented as 
complementary, environmentalism is more likely to be taken seriously and acted upon (e.g. Borel-Saladin and 
Turok 2013; Hinterberger et al. 2009). Its proponents argue that alternative means of addressing the 
environmental, economic and social crises, such as moving away from marketization, consuming less, or 
banning harmful activities, are, naïve at best and, at worst, extremely detrimental to the goal of a better world. 
Reducing consumerism is considered to be a negative message for governments, businesses and citizens, 
implying job lay-offs, loss of profits, and self-denial.  
However, when Green Economy was debated at the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20), the concept and the underlying principles about how to achieve an equitable green 
transition were strongly contested by anti-capitalist and non-capitalist participants. Most of the critiques 
centered on the perceived neglect of the social consequences of the policy (e.g. People's Summit for Social 
and Environmental Justice 2012). Critiques of Green Economy came particularly from indigenous social 
movements, who warned that, though this approach promises to eradicate poverty, it actually favors corporate 
interests and will create more environmental problems though the promotion of risky technologies. For 
example, at the Indigenous People's Global Conference on Rio+20 and Mother Earth, the following appeal 
was made: 
 
We urge all humanity to join with us in transforming the social structures, institutions and 
power relations that underpin our deprivation, oppression and exploitation….We need to 
fundamentally reorient production and consumption based on human needs rather than for the 
boundless accumulation of profit for a few…We demand that the United Nations, governments 
and corporations abandon false solutions to climate change, like large hydroelectric dams, 
genetically modified organisms including GMO trees, plantations, agro-fuels, "clean" coal, 
nuclear power, natural gas, hydraulic fracturing, nanotechnology, synthetic biology, bio-
energy, biomass, biochar, geoengineering, carbon markets, Clean Development Mechanism 
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and REDD+ that endanger the future and life as we know it (from the Kari-Oca II declaration, 
'Indigenous People's Global Conference on Rio+20 and Mother Earth' 17th June 2012). 
 
Criticism has also come from the national governments of a group of Latin American countries, 
specifically Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela (UNEP 2013b; UNEP 2015). Most 
of these countries are aligned to ALBA, or 'The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America', an 
organisation based on the idea of social, political, and economic cooperation between the nations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. ALBA is rooted in a socialist approach, and a vision of social welfare, mutual 
economic aid, the rights of indigenous people, social participation and fair and equitable distribution (Muhr 
2013). In this spirit, these national Governments have expressed a great deal of concern with respect to the 
Green Economy paradigm. They do not consider it likely to reduce poverty or inequality and are concerned 
that any specific environmental improvements that do occur will be achieved at the expense of other 
ecological or social issues.  
There have also been academic critiques of the Green Economy paradigm. For example, Victor and 
Jackson (2012) find problems with the UNEP (2011) report on the Green Economy on a number of grounds, 
but primarily because it underestimates the CO2 reduction necessary to avert the risk of catastrophic climate 
change; and because it assumes that investment in the Green Economy will be greater than in the Brown 
Economy. They conclude that: 
 
...it is unlikely that reductions in CO2 emissions (not to mention other global environmental 
pressures) and significant closure of the gap between rich and poor (as required by a truly 
green economy) are simultaneously possible without some curtailment of ambitions for 
economic growth (Victor and Jackson 2012: 15).  
 
Similarly, Brockington (2012), while enthusiastic about some of the radical implications of the UNEP 
report (2011), observes that it is ultimately conservative, being no more than a manifesto of mainstream 
sustainable development. He perceives that UNEP are positioning their discourse so as to gain maximum 
support from business and economic leaders and failing to sufficiently consider the social impacts of 
increased marketization. Moreover:  
 
… the Report simply does not countenance the possibility of change which is not driven by 
ever-increasing consumption and expanding markets (Brockington 2012: 412). 
 
Alongside these diverse criticisms and reservations with regard to the Green Economy paradigm, there 
have been a number of alternative proposals. One of the most radical of these is Vivir Bien (Living Well), 
sometimes also referred to as Buen Vivir, or Suma Qamaña in Aymara, Sumaj Kawsay in Quechua, or Ñande 
Reko in Guaraní. Rooted in the worldview of Andean indigenous groups, the concept of 'Vivir Bien' describes 
a communal approach to addressing the multiple environmental crises, whilst meeting human needs and 
achieving equality. It aspires to living in harmony with other human beings and nature in relationships of 
service and reciprocity; and subsumes all economic and social objectives to the protection of ecosystems, 
which are considered to be the foundation for the accomplishment of all social goals (Radcliffe 2012). 
Importantly, Vivir Bien implies that we are part of a whole, so that we cannot live well if other humans do not, 
or at the expense of our environment. It urges regulatory mechanisms and community participation in 
decision making to address environmental issues and eradicate poverty, and it inherently critiques the 
accepted need for economic growth, emphasizing meeting needs and satisfying rights. Under this ethos, the 
economy is based, not on the profit motive, but respect and care for humans and the rest of nature in a spirit of 
solidarity. Hence, Living Well differs from traditional understandings of wellbeing and development in its 
critique of anthropocentrism; individualization of satisfaction; paternalism; capitalism; perpetual economic 
growth; material accumulation and the commodification and mercantilization of nature (see, for example, 
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Gudynas 2010). Living Well has, so far, been introduced into the Constitutions and development plants of two 
Latin-American countries: Bolivia and Ecuador. However, interest in the approach is spreading rapidly in the 
Global South. The Summit of the Group of 77 plus China, now chaired by Bolivia, marked the alliance's 50th 
anniversary in 2014 with the adoption of a declaration 'For a New World Order for Living Well' laying out 
commitments to eradicating poverty, eliminating racism, gender equality, reducing inequality, raising basic 
living standards and development in harmony with nature (UN 2014). 
Unlike the criticisms of the Green Economy, there has been no direct critique of Living Well as a 
policy orientation (although there have been critiques regarding how it has been implemented, as will be 
discussed later). The virtual silence may be because it is not yet being taken sufficiently seriously as a 
development alternative by the supra-national agencies, despite some recent acknowledgements of its 
existence and value (e.g. UNEP 2013b; UNEP 2015).  
In general, the Green Economy and Living Well paradigms have been developing in parallel, with little 
evidence-informed debate. On the rare occasions that they have been compared, there has been a tendency to 
promote one or the other approach without referring to the impacts from their practical application (e.g. 
Pachero 2013). This article addresses this gap by examining how the two macro-policies have so far 
manifested in practice, focussing on South Korea (Green Economy) and Bolivia (Living Well), each global 
leaders in their respective approaches.  
South Korea and Bolivia are useful cases to compare because they exemplify quite extreme versions of 
each model or paradigm, and this is useful for identifying potential impacts (as the impacts may, 
consequently, also be more extreme). Furthermore, they were both the earliest adopters of these paradigms 
and each country is widely viewed as the key leader in their respective approach (e.g. UNEP 2013; 2014). 
However, they begin from very different starting points. South Korea is a high income and developed country 
with a very short colonial past (colonized by Japan from 1920 to 1945) whilst Bolivia is a middle income 
country with an extensive colonial history. It is important to take these different contexts into account in the 
analysis. With this in mind, the next sections provide some relevant background to the countries before 
outlining the relevant processes and impacts of the respective policies in South Korea and Bolivia. 
 
3. Green Economy and Living Well in practice 
Green Economy in South Korea  
South Korea has been applauded internationally for its apparent economic and social progress, 
particularly in terms of growth. Over the last six decades, the country has transformed itself with very fast 
export-fuelled economic growth and rapid industrialization, and its GDP is now the 15th highest in the world. 
However, its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have rocketed over this period (see Table 5). South Korea is 
also one of world's largest energy consumers and currently imports approximately 96 percent of the energy 
that it uses in the form of oil, coal and liquefied natural gas (IEA 2012). Its energy use has been increasing in 
recent years. Between 2000 and 2010, the country's total final consumption of energy (TFC) increased by 24 
percent (IEA 2012). Therefore, in order to continue to grow but become more energy independent and reduce 
its climate emissions, the government has embraced and developed 'Green-Growth' policies. This process was 
initiated by former president, Lee Myung-bak who, in 2008, proposed that 'Low-Carbon Green Growth' 
(LCGG) should be the new national development paradigm for the next 60 years (NRCS 2012). As a result, a 
Presidential Committee on Green Growth and a Low-Carbon Green Growth strategy was launched. The 
strategy was essentially a fiscal stimulus program, targeting 2.6 percent of GDP to ostensibly green initiatives.  
Most academics and NGOs (Korean and external), as well as key supra-national organizations, frame 
South Korea's environmental project as Green Economy (e.g. UNEP 2014; WRI 2011; Yun and Cho 2011). 
For example, UNEP showcases Korea's Green Growth projects and programs under its Green Economy 
Initiative (UNEP 2014). The Korean government, whilst more frequently using the discourse of Green 
Growth, uses the terms Green Growth and Green Economy interchangeably, or subsumes Green Growth 
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under Green Economy. Hence, the Korean Statistics Agency (KORSTAT) uses Green Growth Indicators 
(GGIs) as key measures of the country's Green Economy performance (Min 2015).  
The Government laid out three objectives for Green Growth/Green Economy: economic growth with 
minimal use of energy and resources; reduced CO2 emissions and environmental pollution with the same 
energy and resource use; and new growth through research and development in green technologies, so as to 
achieve early dominance in international markets. The Low Carbon Green Growth strategy was to be 
implemented mainly through incentives for companies to develop green technologies and products; public 
information/education to increase awareness and demand for green products; and regulatory measures 
(particularly the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from industry).  
Though not required to reduce emissions under the Kyoto Protocol due to their developing economy 
status at the time of the negotiations, in 2009 the Government set a greenhouse gas reduction target of 30 
percent by 2020, the most ambitious target of the Non-Annex I countries to date. In order to achieve this, a 
Target Management System (TMS) was initiated, setting emissions targets for 470 participating companies. 
The Government provided a great deal of financial assistance to enable the targeted companies to comply, 
subsidizing up to 50 percent of the cost of installing energy-efficient and low-carbon facilities, as well as 
offering loans and tax exemptions for the remaining costs. The TMS became the precursor for an Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS), adopted in 2012 by the South Korean National Assembly, making it one of the first 
governments in the world to set up such a scheme (IEA 2012). The South Korean carbon market is now the 
world's second largest, after the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
In addition to this, innovation and new technology is an important pillar of the Green Economy 
approach in South Korea, supported by billions of dollars of public finance (Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy, 2009). Financial incentives are available for different phases of environmental business 
development, including research and development, and commercialization. Alongside some clearly beneficial 
technologies, such as photovoltaic panels, wind energy technology and Light Emitting Diode (LED) 
appliances; the Government also plans to support development of the following more controversial 
technologies: fuel cells; carbon capture and storage (CCS); nuclear reactors;  green cars; bio-technology; 
robot applications; nano-fusion; and bio-pharmaceuticals (Ministry of Knowledge Economy 2009; National 
Science and Technology Council 2009; Presidential Council for Future and Vision 2009). The Government 
has designed various financial policies to mobilize public funds for credit to environmental businesses 
through public financial institutions, such as the Korea Development Bank and the Korea Credit Guarantee 
Fund. 
Much Korean environmental education is focused on stimulating demand for green products and 
encouraging individual green behavior patterns (see GGGI 2011). To help develop the market for ecological 
products, the Government introduced a mandatory eco-friendly product procurement scheme for public 
institutions and provides incentives, as well as practical information, to encourage citizens to shop green. For 
example, commercial banks have been encouraged to give preferential rates to customers who purchase eco-
products with a specific credit card linked to their account (Kang et al. 2012). In addition, for the last 20 
years, the Government has managed an eco-labelling system which provides consumers with environmental 
product information.  
Hence, with its focus on trading, private sector innovation, individual consumption practices and 
subsidies to private companies, the South Korean Government has been at the forefront internationally of 
promoting and developing a market led interpretation of the Green Economy. In 2010, the Government helped 
to set up the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), which it now leads, dedicated to diffusing green growth 
around the world (GGGI 2013). The underlying assumption, as outlined in their 'vision' is: 
 
…the belief that economic growth and environmental sustainability are not merely compatible 
objectives; their integration is essential for the future of humankind (GGGI 2013:1).  
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South Korea's Green Economy program has been lauded by the OECD, UNEP, World Bank, IEA, the 
G8 and the G20,  For example UNEP presented South Korea as a model green transition nation, stating, for 
example:  
 
Beyond its policies at the national level, the Republic of Korea is demonstrating engagement 
and leadership at the international level by boosting global efforts towards achieving a green 
economy … UNEP and the Republic of Korea are collaborating to support initiatives on green 
economy in developing countries (UNEP 2014: 1). 
 
The South Korean Green Growth/Green Economy advocates interviewed for this study had high hopes 
for this policy. For example, one of the interviewees said: 
 
The Green Economy is our best hope for preventing more environmental degradation, and our 
Low Carbon Green Growth Strategy is the practical application of that. We seek to transform 
economic growth so as to achieve sustainable development. There is going to be a big leap 
forward in environmental achievements in Korea. What's more, this is a policy that is led by 
developing countries (interview 12th October 2012, Policy Executive, Government of the 
Republic of Korea). 
 
However, most of those interviewed had doubts and reservations, if not outright hostility, towards 
Green Economy as implemented in South Korea. This seems to reflect the dominant national opinion. A 
representative from the Korean Citizens Movement for Environmental Justice estimated that most 
environmental organizations and up to 70 to 80 percent of the Korean people are against major portions of the 
Green-Growth platform (e.g. interview, 21 January 2013, Heeseon Sim, Policy Officer, Citizens Movement 
for Environmental Justice). Strong internal opposition to the Green Economy/Green Growth programs has 
come from Korea's trade unions and social movements, including the Citizens' Movement for Environmental 
Justice; Green Korea United; the Korean Green Party (Plus); Federation of Korean Trade Unions; Korean 
Federation of Construction Industry Trade Unions; Korean Power Plant Industry Union; and the Korea 
Peasants League. These groups refer to the Green Economy and LCGG strategies as 'green wash', warning 
that the portrayal of this program as a successful model by the international community is based on a lack of 
understanding and knowledge of what is really happening in South Korea. They have stated:  
 
The world has been deceived by the Korean government's new vision for 'Green Growth'… this 
Green Growth policy currently touted in Korea is no more than an economic development 
vision ... Large scale civil engineering projects and constructions, such as nuclear power plants, 
are driving the Korean environment into a catastrophe (COP15 Korea NGOs Network 2009).  
 
Their criticisms include, the lack of focus on reducing energy use; the planned increase in nuclear 
power; the low renewable energy targets; the focus on developing an overseas food supply; the emphasis on 
road transport, as opposed to railways; the increased privatization of resources, including water; the emphasis 
on projects which benefit developers at the expense of the environment; and the proposed deregulation of 
some environmental legislation (e.g. interview, 21 January 2013, Heeseon Sim, Policy Officer, Citizens 
Movement for Environmental Justice).  
These concerns appear to be valid, according to the quantitative data and policy documentation I 
reviewed. Energy use, including coal and oil, continues to increase at an alarming rate (Korean Environment 
Statistics Information Service 2014; data to 2012). At the same time, as Joung-Woo et al. (2012) point out, 
1.2 million South Korean households experience 'fuel poverty', spending more than 10 percent of their income 
on energy. Furthermore, though renewables are to be developed in a bid to enable the country to gain an 
advantage in the world market for low-carbon technologies (Kang et al. 2012), up to 50 percent of the energy 
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required to grow the economy will be provided by nuclear power (Sanders 2010). Hence, 12 additional 
nuclear power plants will need to be built, in addition to the existing 20 (Sanders 2010). Moreover, 
agricultural outsourcing has continued apace, as was attempted in the now-infamous Daewoo Logistics–
Madagascar deal of 2008. Half of Madagascar's arable land, as well as some rainforests, were to be converted 
into palm and corn monocultures for South Korea's food and energy consumption, while much of the local 
population went hungry. This 'land grab' attracted particular attention because of its size (1.3 million hectares) 
and the ensuing riots and overthrow of the Madagascan government. The Government's LCGG strategy has 
also included the deregulation of factory sites and the lifting of greenbelt restrictions within the Seoul region 
to enable more growth and development, including previously prohibited building on mountainsides. 
Furthermore, large scale engineering projects have been an important part of the strategy. For example, the 
controversial 'Four Rivers Restoration Project' was proposed to dredge, dam and 'beautify' four major rivers, 
supposedly to increase the supply and quality of fresh water and prevent flooding and drought as an 
adaptation to climate change. The project accounted for 36.8 percent of the budget for the government's Green 
Economy program, the highest share (Yun 2010). Although more than 70 percent of Korean citizens criticized 
the project on the grounds that it would kill the ecosystems of the four rivers, the project proceeded without 
respect for legal process (Yun 2010). A number of the interviewees expressed concern about this, asserting 
that the Government undertook these projects primarily for the benefit of the large civil engineering and 
building companies that were awarded contracts (e.g. interview, 1 February 2013, Yujin Lee, Director of 
Policy Making Committee, Korean Green Party Plus). The LCGG strategy will not even succeed in lowering 
carbon emissions, they argued, as South Korea's carbon footprint could increase with the resulting burst of 
construction. Hence, one high level state executive stated:  
 
Many of us are concerned about the Green-Growth strategy. I think, mostly, this strategy is to 
incentivize industry which produces environmental goods, for example, companies producing 
wind and solar power generators … It is not exactly an environmental policy, it is more a 
business strategy and, more controversially, it emphasizes nuclear energy as an alternative 
energy to oil. But the nuclear waste problem has not been solved in Korea so it will be a great 
problem if this strategy continues to be implemented (interview 9th October 2012, Social Policy 
Executive, Government of the Republic of Korea). 
 
Korean academics have also been critical of the LCGG strategy. For example, Yun (2010) argues that 
the Government's proposed policies and projects are based on a distorted and narrowed concept of 'green', 
purely focusing on carbon emissions. Yun considers that this policy is being used to make the active pursuit 
of growth more palatable and to narrow the acceptability of environmental policies that are not combined with 
growth. This co-option of the green agenda has, to some extent, taken the attention away from the domestic 
environmental movement and subsumed 'green' under what amounts to a growth-biased discourse.  
Even pro-Green Economy analysts in South Korea have significant reservations. Rhee et al. (2012), for 
example, report that though greenhouse gases have reduced since the LCGG strategy was announced, the rate 
at which this has occurred indicates that the overall reduction will only be approximately 42 percent of that 
planned (Rhee et al., 2012). Furthermore, they point out:  
 
… the biggest stakeholder of all, the general public of Korean society, is not well informed 
about the national green growth strategies. This is partly because the detailed contents are not 
fully open yet and also because the policy-making processes are practically closed to the 
general public (Rhee et al. 2012: 35-36).  
  
Hence, though it is too early to judge the longer term outcomes of this policy, it has a number of 
worrying aspects, in terms of promoting many risky and/or ineffective technologies and programs. It could be 
argued that continuous growth is necessary to deliver improved human wellbeing, and so Green Growth 
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should be the preferred option for eco-social transition. However, growth has not improved social outcomes in 
recent years. In spite of sustained growth in the five years to 2011, the share of the Korean population living 
on less than 50% of the median income increased from 14.3% to 15.2% (OECD 2012c). In addition, though 
welfare provision in South Korea has been expanding over the last fifteen years (Ringen et al. 2011), social 
insurance programs, including pensions and social security after employment loss, still cover less than half of 
the population in the relevant categories (Kwon 2014). Social spending stands at only 8.1 percent of GDP. 
This is low by international standards, with the average OECD spending being 19.8 percent of GDP (Joung-
Woo et. al. 2012; 2011 data). Furthermore, the relative poverty rate in South Korea doubled between 1996 
and 2008 during a period of very high growth (Jones and Yoo 2012). High inequality continues and is visibly 
evident (see Figure 1). Therefore, the OECD has made a statement regarding the need for Korea to look 
beyond growth in its policies, stating: 
 
While economic growth can help reduce income inequality and poverty, Korea's experience 
shows that achieving a high growth rate is not sufficient in itself to address inequality and 
poverty (OECD 2012b: 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Gangnam Style? Inequality in Seoul showing prosperous Gangnam in the distance 
and poverty stricken Guryong in the foreground. Source: Mike Stulberg (2013). 
 
Neither has growth in South Korea been successful in improving human rights. According to a recent 
report of the International Trade Union Confederation, South Korea sits in category 5 for employment rights, 
making it one of "the worst countries in the world to work in" (ITUC 2014a:15). An international delegation 
of trade union groups, including ITUC, reported on the human rights situation in the country in terms of the 
Korean government "...engaging in a wave of intense repression against labour and civil society of the kind 
not seen in recent years and which threatens to hollow-out the country's democracy" (ITUC 2014b: 1).  
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Furthermore, there is no evidence that growth in the country has enhanced psychological wellbeing. 
Suicide rates have almost doubled over the last ten years so that the country now has the second highest 
suicide rate in the world (Värnik 2012). Park (2013) considers these rates have increased because younger 
South Koreans, in particular, are caught in cultural clashes between the new individualistic and intensely 
competitive economy impacting on school and the workplace, and the older Confucian expectations of 
reciprocity and caring for the family. These competitive pressures seem to be just as implicit in the Green 
Economy as the Brown Economy. 
Perhaps because of the internal criticisms of Green Economy implementation in South Korea, there has 
been some faltering of the project over the last year or so. The Presidential Commission on Green Growth, set 
up by Lee in 2008, was down-graded to a ministerial committee by the new Park Government and a number 
of the 'green' ministries were down-sized and re-named. The Government ministers seemed to be keen to 
distance themselves from their predecessors' legacies, though they have now re-embraced the project under a 
new guise, embarking upon 'Green Growth 2.' This does not seem to indicate a change of direction, but rather 
a change of packaging so as to break the public association with some of the less popular aspects of the 
program, such as the 'Four Rivers Restoration Project.' 
Although the outcomes of the Green Economy project in South Korea are still uncertain, the evidence 
from this initial overview indicates that this approach, as enacted in South Korea, does not protect the 
environment or deliver social necessities in a holistic way. Some of the solutions being proposed and 
implemented, such as developing risky technology and outsourcing agriculture, merely displace problems 
geographically, historically or socially. Though some environmental improvements may occur as a result of 
better management practices, incentives to change consumer habits, investment and new regulations, in 
general, Green Economy does not seem to support an effective and equitable eco-social transition. The kinds 
of policies and programs that have been implemented as part of the Green Economy in South Korea have 
even been socially and environmentally deleterious on occasion, suggesting that the Green Economy policy 
could be very problematic if adopted on a global scale. The next section examines one of the proposed 
alternative approaches - Living Well, as implemented in Bolivia. 
 
 Living Well in Bolivia 
Whilst a number of governments are interested in the Living Well concept (World Bank 2015a), the 
Bolivian Government was the first in the world to fully embrace this philosophy. According to the 2009 
constitution, all development projects should now be evaluated through a lens of Vivir Bien. The approach 
was further strengthened with the passing of the 'Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development 
for Living Well' in 2012. This national legislation established 11 new rights for nature, including: the right to 
life and to exist; the right to continue vital cycles and processes free from human alteration; the right to pure 
water and clean air; the right to balance; the right not to be polluted; the right to not have cellular structures 
modified or genetically altered; and the right not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects 
that affect the balance of ecosystems. A new office has now been set up to roll out the program - the 
'Plurinational Authority for Mother Earth' within the Ministry of Environment and Water. The first activity of 
this office was to organize the First National Workshop on Climate Change Policies which included social, 
academic, public and private organizations and representatives looking at how to increase community 
participation in the development of climate change policies.  
Many formal policies, legislative proposals and training programs are still in the process of being set 
up but we can already see some indication of environmental and social achievements resulting from the 
Living Well paradigm. Since the MAS government came to power and, particularly with the initiation of the 
Living Well policy, Bolivia has stabilized or reduced a number of environmental harms, including many 
which have worsened under Green Economy in South Korea. This includes energy use and C02 and 
Greenhouse Gas emissions (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). 
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia 662  697  834  704  737  759  756  779  831    
Korea 4,337  4,368  4,419  4,573  4,639  4,661  5,060  5,232  5,268  5,222   
 
Table 1: Energy use (kg of oil equivalent per capita). Source: World Bank 2015 Energy use (kg 
of oil equivalent per capita) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE/countries?page=1 
 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia 1.5  1.3  1.6  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6    
Korea 10.0  9.6  9.7  10.2  10.4  10.3  11.5  11.8     
 
Table 2: CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita). Source World Bank 2015 CO2 emissions per 
capita. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?page=1 
 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Bolivia 127.56 121.77 128.03  
 
132.80 129.82 128.78 154.85 140.28 136.47 
Korea 528.77  
 
527.95 536.53  
 
551.21 563.43 577.86 626.88 654.86  
 
661.39 
 
Table 3: GHG data - Total GHG emissions including land-use change and forestry  (Mt CO2e – 
Million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent). Source: CAIT Climate Data Explorer, 2015. 
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Available online at: http://cait.wri.org.  
 
 
Greenhouse Gas emissions have decreased since 2010 (see Table 3). Moreover, where Bolivia 
formerly had one of the highest deforestation rates in the world (UN-REDD 2010), this has dropped 
dramatically: By 64% since 2010. The official government data on this, from the Bolivia Forest and Land 
Authority (ABT) (see Andersen 2014) corresponds to independent data (Hansen 2013). Fuentes (2015) points 
out that 2010 is the year the government officially opposed carbon offset schemes, set up a state body to 
protect forest areas, and put large areas of forest under the management of local indigenous people – all 
programs that fit with the principles of Living Well. 
There have also been a number of environmental improvements that impact on daily life. For example, 
improvements to local transport systems have focused on benefitting low income groups, such as the new 
cable car public transit system in La Paz (Figure 2). In addition, there have also been new Government 
initiatives to improve quality and access to water, such as the 'Mi Aqua' program which is extending improved 
water coverage throughout the country (Slunge and von Walter 2013).  
Within the Living Well paradigm, there has also been an emphasis on reviving local traditions and 
knowledge. For example, traditional medicine, which is much less likely to have a negative environmental 
impact than the polluting pharmaceuticals used in allopathic medicine (see for example, Kümmerer 2009), is 
now being promoted by the State. The Government is intent, not only on creating a national system of 
traditional medicine, but ensuring that it has the same status as Western medicine (Johnson 2010). At the 
same time, nutritious indigenous crops that have fallen out of widespread popular consumption (e.g. grains 
such as quinoa and amaranth) are now being promoted (Johnson 2010). 
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Figure 2: Consultation on new cable car public transit system for La Paz Source: Karen Bell 
(2013). 
 
Social indicators have also improved, with poverty and inequality rates reducing dramatically in recent 
years as a result of redistributive measures. According to Bolivia's National Institute of Statistics, poverty 
levels fell from 60.6 percent in 2005 to 49.6 percent in 2010, with the greatest reduction occurring in rural 
areas (from 77.6 percent to 65.1 percent) (INE Bolivia 2013). Recent international figures back these findings, 
indicating that there has been a significant drop in absolute poverty rates (the proportion of those living on 
less than US$2 per day) from 60 percent in 2006 to 30 percent in 2011 (CIA 2011). This is, in part, because 
the minimum wage has increased by 127 percent since 2005, outpacing the rate of inflation. However, the 
main programs to reduce poverty and inequality have been transfer payments targeting the most vulnerable 
groups, a national pension and social security scheme (Renta Dignidad), and a national health insurance 
program for under 25s (interview, 8 April 2013, Magdalena Lázaro, General Secretary of the National 
Confederation of Indigenous Women of Bolivia - Bartolina Sisa). In addition illiteracy, which stood at over 
13 percent of the population in 2006 was eradicated after a 33 month campaign (UNESCO 2009). There has 
also been a reduction in the proportion of the urban population living in slums (i.e. dwellings which are 
overcrowded, made of non-durable material, or without access to improved water or sanitation services), 
which has fallen from 54.3 percent in 2000 to 47.3 percent in 2009 (UNDP 2012). Furthermore, there have 
been inroads into reducing inequality. According to Government statistical data, the Gini Coefficient dropped 
from 0.62 in 2005 to 0.53 in 2009, the latest date for which there are figures (INE, Bolivia 2013). Hence, the 
UNDP Human Development Index rating has also improved for Bolivia (whilst it has stayed the same for 
Korea) (see Table 4). Though the HDI may be better in Korea, it is the change that has occurred since the 
initiation of these divergent policies that is indicative of the usefulness of the policy paradigm. Arguably, it is 
easier to make improvements from a lower starting point but this evidence is still worth considering in the 
context of the other data discussed here.  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia No data for this period 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Korea No data for this period 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
 
Table 4: UNDP HDI. Source: UNDP HDI http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles 
Bell  Green Economy or Living Well? 
 
Journal of Political Ecology                                     Vol. 23, 2016                                                                    84 
 
As well as the aforementioned national impacts, Living Well is also beginning to have international 
consequences. In 2010, a global victory for Vivir Bien occurred when the UN voted unanimously to accept 
Bolivia's proposal to make water and sanitation a human right. Introducing the text, Bolivia's representative 
said these rights had not been fully recognized, despite references to it in various international instruments, 
and called on states and international organizations to scale up their efforts to provide safe, accessible and 
affordable drinking water and sanitation for all (UN General Assembly 2010). Most counties (122) voted in 
favor of the resolution (though South Korea was one of the 41 countries that abstained).  
The Vivir Bien approach is also evident in Bolivia's unique position on the world stage to the issue of 
climate change. The Bolivian government has taken a principled position in the United Nations climate 
change negotiations, pushing for a binding, ambitious and justice-based agreement. For example, in 
December 2009, at the UN Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen (COP15), Bolivia advocated climate 
reparations from the Global North to the South, and called for a 1 degree Celsius maximum limit on 
temperature increases.  
Living Well in Bolivia has been praised and condemned internationally and internally. For example, 
Globe International and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the 
London School of Economics, described the new Framework Law in positive terms as a 'sweeping overhaul' 
of the national management of natural resources, climate and ecosystems (Nachmany et al. 2014). However, it 
also criticized the policy for a lack of quantifiable targets that would make it possible to assess its 
implementation, something the government is now working on. 
The policy has also been criticized for being anti-modern, though this is mainly an allegation made by 
those that are external to the country. For example, a US based blogger vehemently announced "Bolivia is 
being run by anti-economic socialists, anti-science astrologists, and anti-biology organicists" (Hicks 2012). 
Yet, there is no dismissal of modernity or science within the Living Well approach. State-sponsored science 
and technology projects are increasingly prominent in Bolivia and much is being done to foster work in these 
fields, though with an emphasis on using local materials and methods and respecting indigenous or ancestral 
knowledge (Centellas 2010). In addition to these criticisms, here have also been accusations that the 
government is not really committed to the Living Well ideals it professes. This critique was evident in some 
of the research interviews. For example, it was alleged that the new Framework Law was not sufficiently 
strong with regard to environmental protection or indigenous rights, as in the following excerpt:  
 
There is a discourse from the Government which gives an international impression but, in 
Bolivia, they are continuing with these practices that cause environmental and social problems 
… The Government maintains the discourse of Vivir Bien but takes the road of 
industrialisation… (interview, 20 March 2013, Martin Vilela, International Relations 
representative of the Bolivian Platform on Climate Change). 
 
Criticisms have particularly centered on Bolivia's continuing development of extractive industries and 
infrastructure projects. In particular, there was a widespread outcry surrounding the building of a road through 
Isiboro Ségure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) in the central lowlands of Bolivia. The 
international media and some academics focused on these protests and the supposed hypocrisy of the 
Government, in particular Evo Morales, in wishing to build a road through a sensitive ecosystem (e.g. 
Zimmerer 2013: 7). 
International environmental NGOs, as well as less formal groups and local organizations, including the 
lowland indigenous federation, CIDOB, argued that the construction of the road would be ecologically and 
socially very damaging. Some groups on the left accused the Government of pursuing pro-capitalist 
development at the expense of the rights of indigenous people, considering the road to be mainly a means of 
facilitating hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. In some cases, the protesters and NGOs involved 
proposed that the area be designated as untouchable i.e. as a sacred space, not to be altered.  
However, the Government and its supporters, including a large proportion of indigenous communities, 
considered the road to be essential to bring services to the people living in the TIPNIS region. Far from 
indigenous people opposing the Government, as the media tended to portray it, the TIPNIS situation was 
Bell  Green Economy or Living Well? 
 
Journal of Political Ecology                                     Vol. 23, 2016                                                                    85 
 
characterized by conflicts between the different social movements and between various indigenous groups. 
These take very different positions with regard to a number of environmental and social issues, in part due to 
the history of the formation of these groups and movements. Some, often supported by international NGOs, 
anthropologists and religious groups, have organized specifically around identity, ethnicity and culture, for 
example, the Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Federation of Eastern Bolivia—
CIDOB). Others have focused more on class or a critique of capitalism, for example, the predominately 
Aymara and Quechua highland campesinos who have formed the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian 
Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Union Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers (CSCB) and the 
National Federation of Bolivian Campesino Women-Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS) (Postero, 2010). Therefore, 
though CIDOB and other groups were opposed to the TIPNIS road, the main campesino groups (largely 
indigenous), leaders from the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) and indigenous groups in the south of TIPNIS, 
all came out in support of a road, highlighting the benefits the road would bring in terms of access to basic 
services and ability to trade.  
In October 2011, the Government responded to the protests by passing Law 180, prohibiting the 
construction of a road through TIPNIS and designating it as untouchable. Even so, protests continued, this 
time from the supporters of the road, on the grounds that an untouchable status would undermine the 
livelihood of some of the local people. Consequently, the Government set up a consultation process regarding 
whether the road should be constructed through TIPNIS and if the area should be designated as untouchable . 
When the extended consultation process ended in December 2012, the result was that, of the 69 indigenous 
communities included, 54 agreed to support the road, 3 were opposed to the road only but were also against 
untouchable status, 1 was opposed to the road and supported untouchable status, and 11 did not participate (6 
could not be reached and 5 boycotted the process) (Supreme Electoral Tribunal – TSE, Bolivia, 2013). Many 
saw this as a triumph for participatory democracy, while others continue to allege that the consultation was 
manipulated, for example through linking the construction of the road to the promise of clinics and schools.  
Though, superficially, the issues seemed to be about whether the provision of services and economic 
development override the rights of the local indigenous communities, this is in the context of a much larger 
question about how to meet the needs of some groups, whilst respecting nature and the needs of others. The 
TIPNIS situation shows that the Government have followed the popular will, and shown a willingness to 
consult and enter into dialogue. In this example and others, the MAS administration tries to steer a course 
between environmentalism and developmentalism, which it considers to be the essence of Vivir Bien (see Bell 
2014 for more on TIPNIS). Fuentes (2015) argues that the worldwide focus on TIPNIS as proof of the 
government's anti-environmentalism seems inconsistent with the Government's actual environmental record, 
particularly in that it presided over a two-thirds reduction in deforestation. He argues that this negative 
discourse on Morales' environmental record occurs because those making these arguments disagree with his 
radical approach to the climate crisis and his critique of capitalism.  
However, it must be acknowledged that dependency on extractivism is a serious constraint to the 
effective implementation of Living Well. It is apparent that Bolivia is still tied to this model, even though the 
share of income from these industries that goes to the state has increased significantly under the MAS 
administration, enabling the Government to introduce new programs in health, education and social security. 
Even so, it has not yet been sufficient to enable Bolivia to build a broader basis for income or employment.  
Whilst Bolivia continues to increase its extraction of natural resources (Vargas and Gómez 2013), the 
Government and most of its supporters see this as a temporary necessity with the aim of eventually breaking 
the country's dependency on extractivism. For example, a recent decision to allow oil and gas drilling in a 
national park was permitted because it was considered that modern 3D seismology techniques can locate and 
extract in an extremely precise manner which would disturb less than 0.1% of the area of the national park. 
The income from the extraction could be used to preserve the park and develop other sustainability projects, 
including clean energy and reforestation (Andersen 2015). 
It is important to take into account Bolivia's relatively recent and extensive colonial history, which has 
kept the country poor despite its resource wealth, and which continues to limit its options. In addition, we 
need to see Living Well in context as a relatively recent policy introduction. It is not yet significantly 
developed as a concept or as a practical program. Without this work, it is open to a variety of interpretations, 
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some of which may not result in a truly eco-social transition. The interviews and discussions I carried out in 
Bolivia indicate that, though most people in Bolivia are aware of the concept, they were not clear what it 
would mean in practice. For example, a Government officer responsible for carrying out environmental 
consultations said: 
 
If you ask me, I do not understand very well what Vivir Bien is. Vivir Bien, the Law of Mother 
Earth, that paradigm is really new and I have not had the opportunity to understand and ask 
questions… so it has to be socialised … I think it is a culture, it is not a simple law. For 
example, for me, Vivir Bien is very different to what it would be if you asked people from the 
country. I do not really understand it. We are not really working on Vivir Bien at the moment 
(interview, 27 March 2013, Senior Environmental Manager, Ministry of Public Works, 
Services and Housing). 
 
Others had clearer conceptions but with diverse emphases. Some focused on Vivir Bien as part of a transition 
to socialism and liberation from external domination. For example, a MAS representative said:  
 
For me, Vivir Bien, is our Andean cosmo-vision. We are a pluri-national state so we are at this 
stage of finding our path to Vivir Bien. The path before was that of capitalism, that of the rich, 
now it is that of the people, to serve the people. Therefore, now our pluri-national state is 
taking the path of the people. We are recuperating all that we have lost and forgotten … 
(interview, 4 April 2013, Leonida Zurita Vargas, Secretary of International Relations, MAS). 
 
Others emphasized the right to basic services, as in the following comment: 
 
Vivir Bien is to live in harmony, to achieve food sovereignty, value our products, our healthy 
food, to guarantee the right to water, electricity, basic services to all the population (interview, 
8 April 2013, Juanita Ancieta Orellana, Executive secretary of the National Confederation of 
Indigenous Women of Bolivia –Bartolina Sisa).  
 
These diverse understandings reflect the various dimensions of Vivir Bien – meeting human needs, 
observing environmental limits, respecting rights, ensuring participatory decision-making and reciprocity. In 
general, though, there is a clear goal to achieve social progress through redistributive means, rather than 
through market-based growth. That is not to say that there has not been growth, as it has been quite strong 
(World Bank 2015b; Table 5), but the Bolivian Government does not focus on growth as the primary route 
out of the country's problems and Living Well is not expected to be achieved as a spill-over from growth. 
Growth has occurred as a result of increased external demand for the country's natural resources alongside 
higher tax burdens on the hydrocarbons and mining sectors (Beatriz and Horatio 2015). The Living Well 
paradigm does not seek growth per se, unlike in the Green Economy paradigm, where it is a key goal and 
measure of success.  
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bolivia 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.6 6.1 3.4 4.1 5.2 5.1 6.8 5.5 
Korea 4.9 3.9 5.2 5.5 2.8 0.7 6.5 3.7 2.3 2.9 3.3 
 
Table 5: GDP Growth in Bolivia and Kore. Source: World Bank 2015 GDP growth (annual) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
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Hence, Bolivia's notion of Living Well incorporates a wide range of aspirations: for decent 
employment, a living wage, freedom from violence, healthcare and access to essential services like water and 
sanitation. It does not completely reject industrialization, growth or even extractivism but is based on an 
awareness of their limits and their need for containment. Though the environmental and social results of the 
Living Well policy are still uncertain, they look promising, with some important early impacts clearly evident, 
both national and international.  
 
4. Achieving an effective and equitable green transition 
The data collated here are indicative of eco-social transition being more equitable and effectively 
delivered through a Living Well, rather than a Green Economy, approach. However, the national examples 
also show that there are no simple green transitions and there is much that remains to be debated and 
researched. It is very early days to see the full impact of these policies, especially in the case of Bolivia which 
only passed the Framework Law on Living Well in 2012. Impacts have not yet been formally assessed and, in 
some cases, longer-term time series data are needed to fully establish whether these are genuine trends, rather 
than just fluctuations. Therefore, it has only been possible to examine the practical application of these 
paradigms in a very limited way.  
It is evident that there is some overlap in approaches, to the extent that both Green Economy and 
Living Well are based on an appreciation that we are living in a way which cannot be sustained in the future 
and which is often at the cost of human health and wellbeing. Both paradigms recognize that we need a 
fundamental change in order to address the multiple crises that we now face. There are a number of programs 
that would fit in Green Economy and Living Well scenarios, including various forms of dematerialization 
(reducing the amount of raw materials needed), including remanufacturing, zero-waste, closed-loop systems 
(where waste products are reused), producing more durable and repairable goods, and using human rather 
than mechanical labor. However, despite some overlap between these macro-policies, Green Economy and 
Living Well are competing paradigms, primarily because of their divergent assumptions about the role of the 
market and the necessity for achieving social equality when addressing environmental problems. The question 
of which is the most appropriate and effective direction to take is, therefore, fundamental. 
The Green Economy, as interpreted in South Korea, is based on an assumption that the market and new 
technology will bring about the required changes, given the support of governments and their ability to create 
the right enabling conditions. It is, therefore, very close to the familiar 'sustainable development' and 
'ecological modernization' development paradigms. It intends to use the same tools: the market, technological 
innovation, and peripheral regulation (minor legal reforms) that resulted in the current environmental, 
economic and social problems.  This lack of radicalism would suggest, as other critics have argued, that it will 
not bring about the fundamental shift that appears to be necessary (Aşici and Bünül 2012; Brand 2012; Kosoy 
and Corbera 2010). Components of the South Korean Green Economy could work well for addressing 
specific environmental problems, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions (mainly via nuclear technology). 
But the approach could well cause numerous other problems since it fails to take a holistic approach to social, 
environmental and economic problems. On the other hand, the Living Well scenario promises to achieve an 
environmentally sound and socially just green transition, but currently these objectives still clash somewhat 
with Bolivian extractivism.  
Both approaches would benefit from taking as holistic an approach as possible when developing their 
policy paradigms. Rather than compromising between various aspects of the environmental, social and 
economic, they could be devising strategies that integrate these aspects, though openly discussing 
shortcomings and attempting to integrate tensions. This would require a strong cross departmental culture and 
secure spaces which enable policy makers to be creative and focus on wider societal goals.  It would also be 
helpful if researchers and commentators aided this process through creating opportunities for more interactive 
and open debate around these opposing policy directions. 
Cook et al. (2012) have been at the forefront of this debate, asserting that we need a 'green society', 
and not just a green economy. They advocate that Green Economy could be stronger though incorporating 
social dimensions into problem definitions at an earlier stage. In addition, they propose that policy responses 
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could include transformative social policy that drives structural change. As the United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) point out, unless the underlying inequality of the current 
economic growth model and power structures is also addressed, it will be difficult to achieve greater equality 
and reduced poverty through the Green Economy (UNRISD 2012).  
Arguably, the most worrying aspect of a Green Economy, as practiced in South Korea, is that it 
maintains the dominant hegemonic commitment to economic growth at a time when the evidence is mounting 
that it needs to end. Growth is not necessary to deliver social goals, though it could be useful if accompanied 
by strong redistributive policies. Evidence shows that, whilst growth can reduce poverty to some extent, it is a 
blunt instrument, since it is distribution neutral. Several studies have noted that, rather than growth, 
redistribution of current income and assets is the most effective form of poverty reduction (e.g. Dagdeviren et 
al. 2001; Gordon et al. 2003; Gordon 2004). For example, in 2004, Gordon argued that a relatively modest 
amount of redistribution would have easily halved world poverty by 2015, whilst economic growth by itself 
would have been unlikely to do so. To eradicate child poverty forever, most countries would require an 
investment of less than 0.5 percent of their GNP, if it could be targeted perfectly (Gordon et al. 2003). 
Economic growth is probably not necessary, then, to reduce poverty and inequality, and certainly not the most 
effective method, as both can be more reliably reduced through redistribution.  What is likely to achieve this 
is progressive taxation or, better still, more equal pay; alongside appropriate environmental, economic and 
social regulation. Whilst Living Well does not explicitly advocate degrowth, it emphasises redistribution, 
rather than growth as the main mechanism to meet human needs. Hence, taxation of the wealthy, income 
transfers and sharing of public goods can and will be the main mechanisms for reducing poverty, meeting 
human needs and achieving ecological sustainability. 
It is also evident that a socially just green transition will need to occur hand-in-hand with extensive 
redistribution of income and wealth on a national and global level. As the trades union movement states, 
because the global poor need to consume more, the wealthy need to drastically reduce their consumption - by 
as much as 90 percent over the next few decades (UNEP/ILO/IOE/ITUC 2008). This is very unlikely to 
happen voluntarily, and so governmental policies which bring about a redistribution of wealth must be the 
basis for the necessary process of change. The incorporation of Living Well into the Bolivian national 
development project, if it is able to resolve the constraints and tensions that currently exist, could be an 
inspiring example of what is possible from national redistribution of wealth. This could also be scaled up to 
the international level, through the climate reparations that Bolivia is requesting to transfer finances from the 
Global North to the Global South. 
Hence, 'Living well' provides a powerful counter-argument to the capitalist model of sustainability that 
has become so widely accepted and it promotes survival and satisfaction as ultimately shared achievements. It 
encourages us to think about what it really means to 'live well', and challenges the mainstream notion of 
development which emphasizes economic growth, instead focusing on meaningful livelihoods, strengthening 
social relations, and fostering a harmonious co-existence with nature (Ruttenberg 2013).  
These are critical times, and this calls for radical and rational action based on open discussion of the 
bigger questions regarding how to integrate social, environmental and economic goals. What is particularly 
evident from an analysis of these countries is that creating socially, environmentally and economically 
sustainable development is fundamentally a political and policy quest. This requires an open and interactive 
examination of the challenges, constraints and tensions faced in securing social progress within environmental 
limits. To this end, academics, policy makers and politicians can work to provide democratic spaces for  
further debate around these diverse policy options and, more generally, how to implement an eco-social 
transition which will offer hope to all those who are currently living in material poverty and emotional despair 
around the world. 
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